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Abstract 
Purpose – The first purpose of this paper is to situate and conceptualise ambiguity in 
the operations management (OM) literature, as connected to supply chain decision-
making (SCDM). The second purpose is to study the role of ambiguity-coping 
mechanisms in that context.  
Design/methodology/approach – This research uses behavioural decision theory to 
better embed ambiguity in a generic SCDM framework. The framework explicates 
both behavioural and non-behavioural antecedents of ambiguity and enables us to also 
ground the ‘coping’ mechanisms as individual and organisational level strategies. 
Properties of the framework are illustrated through two ‘ambiguous’ events – 2011 
Thai Flood and Covid-19 pandemic.  
Findings – Three key findings are documented. First, ambiguity is shown to 
distinctively affect supply chain decisions and having correspondence with specific 
coping mechanisms. Second, our conceptual framework shows how individual coping 
mechanisms can undermine rational-based organisational coping mechanisms, leading 
to ‘sub-optimal’ (poor) supply chain decisions. Third, our study highlights the 
positive role of visibility but surprisingly organisational ‘experiential’ learning is 
imperfect, due to the focus on ‘similar’ past experience and what is known.  
Originality/value – The paper is novel in two ways. First, it introduces ambiguity – 
an often neglected concept in operations management – into the supply chain lexicon, 
by developing a typology of ambiguity. Second, ambiguity-coping mechanisms are 
also introduced as both individual and organisational strategies. This enables the study 
to draw distinctive theoretical and practical implications.    
 
Keywords: Ambiguity, Coping Mechanisms, Supply Chain Decision-Making, 
Behavioural Decision Theory, Covid-19. 
Paper type: Research paper  
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1. Introduction 
 
The operations management (OM) literature recognises that a firm’s supply chain is 
subject to risk and uncertainty (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Simangunsong et al., 2016). 
Not surprisingly supply chain risk is well documented and studied in the literature, 
spawning a whole sub-field in supply chain risk management (Kouvelis et al., 2012; 
Wieland and Wallenburg, 2012). Though the literature has also highlighted the need 
to consider catastrophic risk or the highly improbable (Knemeyer et al., 2009) and 
resilience instead of just risk (Fiksel et al., 2015), it still suffers from a lacuna. This 
has to do with the neglect of ‘ambiguity’ in the OM literature.  
Ambiguity is the imprecision involved in situations when the decision-maker is 
making a judgement, assessment or forecasts (March, 1994). As it is distinct from risk 
and uncertainty (Aven, 2014; March, 1988), supply chain decision-making (SCDM) 
under ambiguity should also be distinct. For example, SCDM under disruptions, can 
be defined as ambiguous because the situational context is characterised by a lack of 
clarity and consistency. The 2019/20 Covid-19 pandemic bears such characteristics. 
Once it unfolded globally, lockdowns in many parts of the world and highly volatile 
demand made supply chain decisions difficult, due to the resultant information 
incompleteness, which in particular, put the medical equipment supply chain under a 
lot of strain (Bloomberg, 2020; Washington Post, 2020).  
While disruptions are good candidates to describe ‘supply chain under ambiguity’, 
an organisation’s operations are also subject to ambiguity under normal circumstances. 
This is due to its supply chain being complex, global and importantly fallible due to 
the human factor, with its well-known errors or biases. As such many supply chain 
decisions, such as procurement, capacity allocation, contracting, scheduling, 
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postponement and demand forecasting, can be modelled as decision-making problems 
under ambiguity.  
The first aim of this paper is to uncover how far the neglect of ambiguity goes 
and contribute to its theoretical conceptualisation within the OM literature. A second 
objective is to investigate the role of ‘ambiguity-coping’ mechanisms in the supply 
chain context. We argue that ignoring ambiguity can be impactful not just because of 
the disastrous effect of ignoring the highly improbable (Craighead et al., 2007; 
Roberto et al., 2006), but problematic for the conclusion that risk management tools 
or strategies can deal with ambiguous situations and disruptions (Colicchia et al., 
2010; Simchi-Levi et al., 2014). A supply chain risk management (SCRM) approach 
to carry out risk assessment tend to use traditional probabilistic approaches (Aven, 
2014, p.163; Colicchia et al., 2010; Wieland and Wallenburg, 2012). For example, to 
quantify supply chain risk, the probability of an event and its business outcomes are 
used to compute its expected value (Christopher and Peck, 2004; Manners-Bell, 2014).  
However, these are deemed as narrow and inadequate. The ‘reductionist’ risk 
approach cannot adequately capture ambiguous threats as it relies on ‘identifiable’ 
statistical information (Fiksel et al., 2015). It is often the case that unclear information 
and signals are ignored, with a focus shifting to risk. Roberto et al. (2006) provide a 
few examples of companies that walked that path with disastrous impact, such as 
Kodak dismissing early unclear signals of the decline of the film business and 
Merck’s misjudgement of the reputational threat following ambiguous data about the 
painkiller Vioxx.  
Studies that do make the risk and ambiguity distinction clear are scant (see 
Ancarani et al., 2013; Dong et al., 2016; Gray and Handley, 2015; Lawson and Potter, 
2012; Natarajan et al., 2012). Still these are either, narrow in their theoretical 
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treatment (Natarajan et al., 2012), or focus on narrowly defined types of ambiguity 
(Dong et al., 2016; Gray and Handley, 2015; Lawson and Potter, 2012). Ambiguity 
can be distinct not only from risk but from uncertainty as well (March, 1994, pp.178-
179), it is multifaceted (March, 1988, pp.12-13), and as argued in this study can be 
‘behaviourally’ grounded (Dhami, 2016).   
Noting these lacunae, this paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, 
drawing from ‘behavioural decision theory’, it proposes a generic supply chain 
decision-making (SCDM) framework to embed ambiguity in the supply chain context 
with behavioural foundations. The framework allows us to develop a typology of 
ambiguity. Extant literature, have shown a surprising neglect for ambiguity and have 
rarely modelled it with a behavioural lens. We seek to remedy this as our framework 
explicates both behavioural and non-behavioural antecedents. As such our paper also 
contributes to the bourgeoning behavioural operations management literature 
(Donohue et al., 2019, 2020; Gino and Pisano, 2008), whose treatment of ambiguity is 
also limited. Therefore, our work reads as an attempt to conceptualise ambiguity in a 
supply chain context with behavioural underpinnings.      
The second contribution of our study is the introduction of the concept of ‘coping 
mechanisms’ to the supply chain lexicon. While ‘organisational’ coping strategies 
consist of mitigation (minimising ambiguous disruptions) and preparedness (resilience 
and robustness) – strategies which are well-documented in the OM literature (Pettit et 
al., 2019; Simangunsong et al., 2012) – the ‘individual’ coping strategies, being 
behaviourally grounded, are not. This should enable us to examine the workings of 
both individual and organisational coping mechanisms, with the possibility to develop 
correspondence between ‘classified’ ambiguities (typology) with these mechanisms.  
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   The next section presents a conceptualisation of ambiguity within a general 
framework, after documenting its treatment in the OM literature. Section 3 provides 
some empirical illustrations of the properties of our framework through two 
‘ambiguous’ events, the 2011 Thai Flood and 2019/20 Covid-19 pandemic. Section 4 
concludes with some implications.     
 
2. Theoretical Development 
2.1. Ambiguity 
2.1.1. Distinct from risk 
March (1994) highlights that risk defines states of the world or situations that can be 
exhaustively and exclusively specified and can be so as information unfolds over time. 
An ambiguous situation instead cannot be exhaustively and exclusively stated or that 
information will bring clarity. Thus, ambiguity can be defined as situations or events 
whose outcomes and likely occurrence are unclear and cannot be coded with precision 
(March, 1994, p.178).  
This distinction can be further characterised through probabilities and 
corresponding belief distribution. Risk is a situation where we can assign objective 
probabilities to outcomes or events. Uncertainty is where we can describe the events 
but cannot assign objective probabilities (though sometimes subjective probabilities 
can be assigned). Ambiguity corresponds to a situation where there is not sufficient 
information to assign objective probabilities and where even a subjective probability 
distribution cannot be defined uniquely (Friberg, 2015; Takemura, 2014). Hence, 
ambiguity is quite distinct from risk, which is supported by experimental evidence 
(Budescu et al., 2002). 
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2.1.2. Situating ambiguity in the OM literature  
Table 1 summarises several ambiguity concepts incorporated in the supply chain 
literature. The literature search focussed first on so-called ‘leading’ journals in OM, 
namely Journal of Operations Management, International Journal of Operations and 
Production Management, and Production and Operations Management, which was 
later extended to include International Journal of Production Economics, Journal of 
Supply Chain Management, Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, and 
Supply Chain Management: An International Journal. Articles and keywords 
containing ‘ambiguity’ was searched and later extended to ‘uncertainty’, as the latter 
is often conflated with ambiguity. Each concept is defined, the studies’ context 
explained and any important facet of the treatment of ambiguity noted (see Table 1).   
 
Table 1. Ambiguity in the Supply Chain Context 
Concept Definition Context(s) Notes 
Performance 
ambiguity 
Difficulty facing decision-
makers (buyers) in 
accurately evaluating 
(suppliers’) performance 
Capacity allocation 
model & managing 
manufacturer quality 
Two studies.  
Normative 
modelling 
Information 
ambiguity 
Interpreting inadequate 
information 
Product clock-speed and 
supply chain integration 
Source of 
ambiguity 
Causal 
ambiguity 
Concerns the ambiguous 
nature of causal 
connections between 
actions and outcomes 
Determinants of 
knowledge transfer & 
Resource advantage 
theory 
Two studies.  
Normative 
modelling 
 
Extreme 
ambiguity 
Decision-makers being 
unware that future 
scenarios are possible  
Sustainable supply chain 
management 
Ambiguity as 
ignorance  
Role ambiguity Uncertain about one’s 
authority and obligations in 
a supply chain relationship 
Role hazard between 
supply chain partners 
Institutional 
distance as 
source of 
ambiguity 
Relational 
ambiguity 
Understanding of two 
businesses operations, 
needs and strategies  
Adaptation of supply 
management & Buyer-
supplier link 
Contractual-
related 
ambiguity 
Processing time 
ambiguity 
Uncertainty about 
probabilities of processing 
time 
Processing Time 
Ambiguity and Port 
Competitiveness 
Normative 
modelling 
Uncertainty 
about 
probabilities 
Preference for gambling on 
known probabilities than 
on ambiguous ones 
Several applications Decision-making 
definition of 
ambiguity 
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The OM literature has treated ambiguity as performance ambiguity (Boloori et al., 
2020; Cachon and Lariveiere, 2016; Gray and Handley, 2015; Wacker et al., 2016), 
information ambiguity (Peng et al., 2008), causal ambiguity (Hunt and Davis, 2008; 
Lawson and Potter, 2012), extreme ambiguity (Silvestre et al., 2015), role ambiguity 
(Dong et al., 2016), relational/contractual ambiguity (Jia et al., 2016; Kim and Choi, 
2015; Steinbach et al., 2018), and processing time ambiguity (Cheon et al., 2017). 
There are also studies which adhere more closely to the ‘uncertainty about 
probability’ definition of ambiguity (Gao et al., 2018; Mak et al., 2014; Natarajan et 
al., 2012; Wu et al. 2008; Zhang et al., 2016). 
The treatment of ambiguity in the OM literature can be summed as follows:  
1) Ambiguity’s consideration in the supply chain literature is limited. A search of 
‘uncertainty’ reveals far more work on ‘supply chain uncertainty’ per se (see 
Simangunsong et al., 2012, 2016). As a further contrast and one noted in the 
introduction, ‘supply chain risk’ has spawned a whole sub-field (Kouvelis et al., 
2012; Wieland and Wallenburg, 2012). This shows a neglect of ambiguity despite 
its relevance.   
2) While most reviewed studies do treat ambiguity as distinct from risk, some 
conflate it with uncertainty (Ancarani et al., 2013), or ignorance (Silvestre et al., 
2015). As defined above, uncertainty is different from ambiguity. Ignorance or 
deep uncertainty describe situations where reliable predictions cannot be made 
because the knowledge base is unreliable (Aven, 2014, p. 162). Ellsberg (1961) 
suggests that ambiguity could lie between risk and complete ignorance.  
3) Ambiguity is quite diversely covered, specific to a context and lacking in 
coherence. Still taken together this showcases a ‘multifaceted’ construct.    
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4) The ‘modelling’ pieces are predominantly normative (rational choice) in 
approach with few studies adopting an explicit behavioural lens (Gao et al., 2018). 
In fact, not much is reported on the ‘sources’ of ambiguity, with studies mostly 
attentive to the non-behavioural sources such as sub-national institutional 
distance (Dong et al., 2016), supplier protectiveness (Lawson and Potter, 2012), 
or pre-contractual conditions (Wacker et al., 2016).   
 
2.1.3. Behavioural decision theory 
Having established how far the neglect of ambiguity goes, we now turn to the 
conceptualisation of ambiguity. To do so we rely on behavioural decision theory 
(BDT). BDT is distinguished from normative decision theory, which models the 
‘desirable’ form of decision-making enshrined as ‘rational’ decision-making (and thus 
rational choice theory), as being concerned with describing how people ‘actually’ 
make decisions (as descriptive decision models) (Takemura, 2014).  
One of the tenets of BDT that makes it distinct is recognising human cognition. 
Several consequences arise as a result. One is in terms of ‘optimising’ behaviour, 
treasured by normative models, that can be altered. As opposed a reasoned optimising 
behaviour (maximising or minimising), ‘satisficing’ human behaviour can be 
observed, where decision-makers are content with non-optimal choices or choose 
options they deem acceptable (Davis, 2019; Takemura, 2014). Another significant 
difference is the resulting ‘cognitive biases’ and thus sub-optimal decisions 
(Davenport, 2020; Roberto et al., 2006).  
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2.1.4. Typology of ambiguity 
Next, we draw on behavioural decision theory’s treatment of ambiguity to develop a 
typology of ambiguity in the supply chain context, which is a more coherent take on 
ambiguity. There are four groupings: 
1) Interpretative ambiguity. Ambiguity in its simplest form implies a situation 
being open to more than one interpretation, with an unambiguous situation 
described as having clear understanding as it has one meaning. As 
organisational life is about sense-making of situations or events, it is quite 
possible that multiple inconsistent interpretations of situations/events are 
developed (March, 1994, p. 184).  Role ambiguity can be regarded as arising 
due to a lack of clarity subject to different meanings. It may rise when a supplier 
is unsure about the means available for it to terminate contracts with distributors 
(Dong et al., 2016), which could be due to inconsistent ‘interpretations’ of its 
power to do so.  
2) Causal ambiguity. The nature of causal connections between factors are often 
difficult to untangle (Bendoly, 2015; March, 1988, p. 337). For example, the 
link between supply chain factors or same factors with performance could be 
unclear. Causal ambiguity could manifest itself in the supply chain context 
where an organisation is unable to determine how it has achieved a competitive 
advantage as a result of some purchasing activity (Hunt and Davis, 2008), or it 
could be a lack of understanding of the linkages between inputs and outputs as 
related to a supplier’s knowledge (Lawson and Pottter, 2012).  
3) Evaluative ambiguity. This type of ambiguity is about decision-makers’ 
assessment of situations (including impact and outcomes). For example, 
ambiguity could arise in connections to a supplier’s performance, the quality of 
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its performance, and processing performance (Cheon et al., 2017; Gray and 
Handley, 2015; Wacker et al., 2016). Gray and Handley (2015) define quality 
performance ambiguity as a situation encountered while outsourcing production 
when it is difficult to ensure product and process specification confirmation and 
identifying responsibilities if something goes wrong. Thus, there is difficulty of 
companies in accurately ‘evaluating’ suppliers’ performance.  
4) Probabilistic ambiguity. This is the classical type of ambiguity, which 
encapsulates ‘uncertainty about probabilities’ and extreme ambiguity (see Table 
1). It relates to decision-makers being unsure about the exact likelihood of 
potential outcomes (Cabantous, 2007). The ‘highly improbable’ is an example 
(Aven, 2014), with decision-makers unaware what future scenarios are possible 
(Silvestre et al., 2015).   
 
2.1.5. Sources of ambiguity 
 
Figure 1. Antecedents of Ambiguous Situations 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the antecedents of ambiguity as connected to the supply chain 
decision-making context. Two situations can be envisioned: normal and disruptive. A 
normal situational context describes regular or day-to-day management of an 
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enterprise operations. Disruptive situational context depicts a situation where the 
normal flow of goods and resources in the supply chain is altered. They can be minor 
or mild on the one hand and turbulent or catastrophic on the other (Craighead et al., 
2007; Fiksel, 2015). The former is normally manageable through routine business 
functions and processes, while the latter can lead to unexpected disruptions to normal 
business operations (Fiksel, 2015, p. 12). In the extreme there is the highly 
unpredictable but impactful events that are disruptive to the supply chain and business 
functions of an enterprise (Gunessee et al., 2018; Knemeyer et al., 2009; Simchi-Levi 
et al., 2014).       
The figure shows for any given situation (normal or disruptive) the decision-
maker (e.g. supply chain practitioner) can face on the one hand decision making under 
unambiguity (risk and uncertainty) and on the other hand decisions made under 
ambiguity. The sources that demarcate a situation into unambiguity or ambiguity are 
two set of factors, information and cognitive factors and supply chain complexity 
factors. The former are individual or behavioural factors, while the latter are 
organisational factors.  
At the core of what is ambiguity is information. Ambiguity can be attributed to 
the extant information: through what is available, whether it is missing or incomplete; 
through its ‘lack of clarity’ due to possible multiple sometimes conflicting meanings 
that can be given to the data; or through the newness of the situation such as lack of 
signals (Budner, 1962). When information is conflicting or ‘unknown’, it can lead to a 
lack of resolution on how to proceed. Ambiguity will be ‘extreme’ if the available 
information is highly unreliable or conflicting (Aven, 2014).  
Information becoming clear and consistent imply: uniquely objective 
probabilities could be assigned to possible outcomes (turning probabilistic ambiguity 
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into risk, as seen in Fig. 1); signals or data being better interpreted to tell coherent 
stories (March, 1988, p. 395); we can shape the meaning of a decision situation 
through our evaluation of outcomes to decipher cause from effect. Thus, information 
in a situational context is a source of ambiguity.  
Somewhat connected to information is human cognition, as a behavioural 
antecedent of ambiguity. People and even organisations are limited in their ability and 
capacity in processing information because of ‘bounded rationality’ (Davis, 2019). 
With such limited cognitive ability, it implies people may not interpret information in 
a reasoned and logical manner (rationally), or have impaired ability to evaluate 
evidence and make connections from such evidence to form correct understandings of 
cause and effect (e.g. interpretative, causal, and evaluative ambiguities). At times 
people’s probabilistic judgements or risk perception are impaired as well due to 
cognitive limitations, giving rise to probabilistic ambiguity (Bendoly, 2015).  
Thus, together information and cognitive factors play a crucial role in giving rise 
to ambiguity. The fundamental notion of limited rationality is that decisions are made 
under incomplete information, as not everything can be known (March, 1988, p. 386), 
implying missing information with limited human cognition magnifies the decision-
maker’s difficulty to interpret or evaluate outcomes of situations, assign probabilities 
to their likely occurrence, or make causal attribution (that is creating interpretative, 
causal, evaluative and probabilistic ambiguities). 
Supply chain complexity is another antecedent of ambiguity. Two factors drive 
complexity, change in an organisation’s external environment and global sourcing. 
Organisations operate in business environments that are not static, but dynamic and 
ever changing. With such external environment in a state of flux this generates 
complexity for an organisation and its supply chain (Silvestre, 2015). Changing 
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business environments give rise to ambiguities through gathering and processing of 
information. This is because organisations may not possess the human resource to 
continually scour the external environment for information, and/or in complex 
business environments they need to put in more effort in information processing, due 
to the large data to process to arrive at a decision (Bosgra, 2008, pp. 175-179).  
A second complexity factor is global sourcing. The global nature of supply chains 
implies greater complexity which in turn creates ambiguity. For instance, global 
sourcing means having to cope with increased reliance of international supply chain 
partners, more customer base to serve, supply lead time variability and international 
transportation (Colicchia et al., 2010; Prater et al., 2001). Accordingly, it has become 
difficult to ‘evaluate’ the potential consequences of such global sourcing (evaluative 
ambiguity).  
 
2.2. Coping mechanisms 
2.2.1. Individual approaches  
 
Figure 2. Coping mechanisms correspondence with types of ambiguity 
 
Individual coping mechanisms refer to how the individual decision-maker deals with 
or manages ambiguous situations (Budner, 1962; Kunreuther and Meszaros, 1997). 
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Coping as a mechanism is a conscious process that is triggered once an ambiguous 
decision-making problem/challenge is encountered (Sjödin et al., 2016). There are 
four ways the decision-maker handles choices made under ambiguity: sense-making; 
(in)tolerance; reference points (assessment); heuristics. The correspondence between 
coping mechanisms and ambiguity types is depicted in Figure 2. 
Sense-making can be defined as making sense of ambiguous situations by 
searching for meaning, settling on the plausible explanation and thus coping with 
ambiguity (Weick et al., 2005). It can take the form of editing, logical analysis, 
attribution, and framing, as means to cope with interpretative, causal and evaluative 
ambiguity. Editing is the structuring of available information in a meaningful way to 
be interpreted, while framing is the subconscious (mental) representations of a 
decision problem as a means to simplify and make sense of it (Soman, 2004). 
Attribution refers to assigning meaning to an unclear relationship. Instead, logical 
analysis is a slow, reasoned and coherent approach to interpret and assess ambiguous 
data (useful to demarcate cause from effect). Probability judgements and weighting 
are assessment of probabilities where small probabilities are given more prominence 
(Davis, 2019).  
Tolerance of ambiguity, as a coping mechanism for probabilistic and 
interpretative ambiguities, reflects the decision-maker’s ambiguity attitudes. 
Tolerance or intolerance to ambiguity is the tendency of the decision-maker of 
interpreting or perceiving ambiguous situations as desirable and thus opportunities or 
as threats (Budner, 1962). Ambiguity aversion is a decision maker’s attitude to avoid 
ambiguity, as s/he has a preference for an outcome with known probability over an 
outcome with unknown probability (Cabantous, 2007; Takemura, 2014). In addition, a 
decision-maker normally prefers to avoid interpretative ambiguity, when faced with 
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limited or multiple meanings from information. When faced with unknown 
consequences from their choices, decision-makers exhibit both high or low ambiguity 
aversion (Boloori et al., 2020).  
Reference points, as means to deal with evaluative and probabilistic ambiguities, 
are specific values used to evaluate alternative options (in terms of outcomes or 
probabilities). The status quo, as the current state/position/view, is a common 
reference point used by decision-makers. This means decision-making is an exercise 
to evaluate a decision relative to maintaining the status quo (Kunreuther and Bowman, 
1997). Illusion of control and being prepared, as connected to reference points, 
represent a decision-maker’s belief/confidence of being in control and thus well-
prepared in his current position, in the face of ambiguity (Schoemaker, 2004).  
Heuristics are mental shortcuts that enable decision-makers to make sense of an 
ambiguous decision-making situation. While there are several heuristics-based rules 
that govern decision-making, we consider three. Fist, the availability heuristic means 
making decisions on the basis of what comes to mind and is relevant to the situation. 
This could be something readily available in the decision-maker’s mind, and thus is 
used to evaluate outcomes or probabilities (Davenport, 2020; Davis, 2019). Second, 
affect heuristic is a decision-maker being influenced by his/her emotions when 
making decisions. Positive and negative emotions can lead decision-makers to focus 
respectively on the potential benefits and losses of their choices (Eckerd and Bendoly, 
2015). Finally, fast and frugal heuristics, through recognition or take-the-best, refer to 
simple short-cuts that use minimum time and knowledge to make quick and adaptive 
decisions in a situation. It requires limited (recognisable) information search and does 
not involve much computation (Gigerenzer, 2004). 
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2.2.2. Organisational strategies   
Organisations develop ‘coping’ strategies to navigate a supply chain world under 
ambiguity. Drawing from the ‘managing supply chain uncertainty’ and ‘supply chain 
resilience’ literatures (Colicchia et al., 2010; Dabhilkar et al., 2016; Fiksel et al., 2015; 
Knemeyer et al., 2009; Simangunsong et al., 2012, 2016), two main strategies can be 
outlined: mitigation; preparedness. Supply chain ‘ambiguity-mitigation’ strategies 
comprise of means to reduce fuzziness that permeates ambiguous situations (normal 
or disruptive). Instead, supply chain ‘ambiguity-preparedness’ strategies are pro-
active strategies used by organisations to deal with ambiguous disruptions, whether 
they are mild or severe. The former comprises of redundancy (holding strategic 
stocks), capacity (backup facilities/raw materials), lean operations (simplifying 
process), and postponement (delaying activities) (Dabhilkar et al., 2016; Fiksel et al., 
2015).  
Preparedness means the enterprise has developed a supply chain that is ready to 
cope with supply chain disruptions. This can be achieved by building supply chain 
resilience, which can be defined as the ability to recover, adapt, grow and flourish in 
the face of uncertain/turbulent change to a supply chain and to return to a desired 
steady state (Pettit et al., 2013; Fiksel, 2015, p. 10). Resilience is achieved by building 
capabilities which includes flexibility (e.g. speed and agility in manufacturing, 
sourcing and order fulfilment) (Fiksel et al., 2015: Prater et al., 2001).  
While organisational coping strategies are broadly important in managing SCDM 
under ambiguity, three specific strategies, collaboration, visibility and organisational 
learning, play a vital role. Collaboration, as the ability to work effectively with supply 
chain partners, and visibility, as the enterprise’s knowledge of its own operations and 
environment, as they facilitate information sharing (Pettit et al., 2019), are crucial to 
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manage supply chain ambiguity. As a factor that implies informational feedback 
within the organisation, organisational learning is another important information 
gathering and ambiguity-coping strategy. Organisations can be better prepared if they 
learn through experience or from historical disruptions (Dabhilkar et al., 2016), 
developing ‘organisational intelligence’ in the process. Such ‘experiential learning’ 
can be supportive of the organisation’s effort to tame ambiguity, as clarity of 
information is vital to quantify possible states of the world, such that, demarcating 
risk from ambiguity (March, 1999).  
Therefore, the reason for these strategies importance, is unlike other strategies 
they go directly to bear on a key source of ambiguity: information. As explained 
above, ambiguity stems from information incompleteness or from unclear multiple, 
often, conflicting meanings. Thus, these three factors can be argued contribute to an 
organisation’s supply chain resilience/preparedness, as they affect one of the root 
causes of ambiguity. 
 
2.3. Generic framework  
Fig. 3 presents a generic framework for SCDM under ambiguity. It consists of 
decision and outcomes at one end and situational context at the other end. Situations 
are normal or disruptive by nature and thus a situation can have an element of 
ambiguity of various types. They have behavioural and non-behavioural antecedents, 
the latter which includes supply chain complexity (see Fig. 1). The framework 
captures coping mechanisms as having a moderating influence, such that a decision-
maker who is influenced by the information available (see Fig. 1), develops coping 
mechanisms to deal with any ambiguous situation faced (Fig. 2). However, s/he is 
‘limited cognitively’ (human cognition in Fig. 1) to process information made further 
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hard with global complex supply chains. At the organisational level coping with 
ambiguity takes the form of mitigation and preparedness. Organisations attempt to 
reduce imprecision of a situation or have developed resilience that enable it to better 
cope, though there is an interplay between individual mechanisms and organisational 
strategies, when ultimate decisions are taken.   
 
Figure 3. Supply Chain Decision-Making under Ambiguity Framework 
    
Supply chain decision-making. Having examined ambiguity and coping mechanisms 
separately, we now relate them to SCDM. Decision-making refers to the act of 
choosing an option from a group of alternatives (Takemura, 2014). In the supply 
chain context, decisions can be seen as strategic or operational. Strategic supply chain 
decisions are concerned about designing operations, processes and supply network 
taking a long-term view, while operational decisions relate to regular activities to 
match demand and supply. Strategic SCDM includes sourcing, production, facility 
location, and distribution and logistics decisions, while operational SCDM includes 
inventory management, demand forecasting, procurement, scheduling and routing 
decisions (Ivanov et al., 2019).  
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Optimising Behaviour, Errors and Biases. Organisations make decisions to optimise 
specific objectives (Ivanov et al., 2019). These could be shareholder value and profit 
maximisation or cost minimisation. In the supply chain context, these could be 
optimising efficiency of any operations and processes, as related to competiveness or 
costs (Manners-Bell, 2014; Ivanov et al., 2019). Differences in optimising behaviour, 
in our framework, is brought to the fore by the behavioural antecedents of ambiguity 
and individual coping mechanisms.  
The tenets of normative SCDM models ascribe behaviour to the decision-maker 
that is more thoughtful, well-reasoned and thus grounded on logical analysis. Such 
logical thinking would lead to the desired supply chain outcomes following from 
optimal choices. However, ambiguous data or even limited or non-existent 
information, imply decision-makers do not necessarily use logical analysis. They 
develop other ‘behavioural’ coping mechanisms to deal with ambiguity. In some 
cases, where the decision-maker uses gut feelings they can arrive at an acceptable 
‘satisficing’ outcome. Similarly, if their tolerance to ambiguity is high, decision-
makers can perceive an ambiguous situation as acceptable and imprecision bearable. 
In such situational context, they display some risk-taking attitudes, develop 
‘resiliency’ to the situation, and use fast and frugal cues to choose adaptively (Budner, 
1962; Gigerenzer, 2004).  
Still this state of affairs is unlikely to survive a disruptive situation. During a 
supply chain disruption, intolerance to ambiguity may prevail. Sense-making with 
high ambiguity aversion/intolerance can lead to decision errors and biases. Human 
cognition, as behavioural antecedent, is suggestive of ‘cognitive biases’ being 
possible. Cognitive biases are systematic errors in the way decision-makers think and 
act, and deviations from logical/rational thinking and analysis (Davis, 2019; Roberto 
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et al., 2006). A consequence of these biases are sub-optimal decisions (Eckerd and 
Bendoly, 2015). This could arise from the use of sense-making, heuristics and 
reference points to navigate ambiguity (Davenport, 2020; Eckerd and Bendoly, 2015), 
in short, individual coping mechanisms.  
Consider an ambiguous situational context where an enterprise uses status quo as 
reference point. Organisations it is argued tend to be highly sluggish in adjusting to 
their environments, such that, they often resist change even when faced with 
ambiguous threats (Kunreuther and Bowman, 1997), developing a preference for the 
status quo, so-called the status quo bias. Coupled with the illusion of control, 
decision-makers in organisations can decide ‘to do nothing’, if they are overconfident 
of their level of preparedness (Davenport, 2020; Schoemaker, 2004). ‘Doing nothing’ 
can also stem from decision-makers subconsciously choosing to ignore the ambiguous, 
if they have developed a high intolerance to it and perceive it as a threat. All this 
explains why organisations facing a major supply chain disruption may initially refuse 
to act. As such, status quo bias and overconfidence (with a dose of ambiguity 
intolerance), as fallouts of individual ambiguity-coping mechanisms, undermine 
organisational coping strategies.    
Using heuristics is often an intuitive and frugal way of making decisions 
(Gigerenzer, 2004), which under normal situations can work to cope with ambiguity 
but under a disruptive context such mental shortcuts can undermine organisational 
coping strategies. For instance, availability heuristic as a means to deal with 
evaluative or probabilistic ambiguity, leads decision-makers in organisations to assess 
an event’s frequency or likelihood on the basis of readily available or recalled 
information (Davenport, 2020; Davis, 2019). In the supply chain context, decision 
managers may be influenced by press and industry attention given to specific 
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disruptive events (Eckerd and Bendoly, 2015). In some cases, when designing 
operations to be resilient to disruptive situations the decision-maker would normally 
think of recent ‘available’ or ‘similarly’ experienced disruptive situations or what was 
recently learnt and experienced. While such experiential learning can be virtuous for 
organisations (Dabhilkar et al., 2016; March, 1999), it can have its limit when human 
cognition is factored in.  
Indeed, the organisational learning literature has recognised the cognitive limit to 
learning under ambiguity (March and Olsen, 1975). However, the argument made in 
this paper is this cognitive limit works under the guise of the availability heuristic and 
for SCDM. In such context, organisational strategies that have been developed to cope 
with ambiguity can be undermined because of this heuristic. With ambiguous and 
incomplete information, such learning could lead SCDM astray, meaning the 
decision-maker is led to think only of those ‘experienced’ disruptive situations that 
are frequently-occurring (more likely) and common. This happens when organisations 
‘myopically’ adopt strategies that was shaped by organisational (experiential) learning 
and focusses only on the ‘known’ alternatives rather than ‘outside the box’ alternative 
means to cope with ambiguity. Yet, what has worked in the past does not necessarily 
imply would work again, and thus relying on such past experience can lead 
organisations making sub-optimal supply chain choices. Unlike the received wisdom 
in the OM literature, this suggests an imperfect role of experiential learning for 
SCDM under ambiguity (further showing how individual coping mechanisms 
undermine organisational coping strategies).  
 
SCDM under ambiguity vs. risk. The implications are also different if we are 
modelling SCDM under ambiguity as opposed risk. Consider, a highly improbable 
disruption, for which historical data is limited and thus hard to interpret. Thus, risk is 
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hard to quantify as assigning probabilities is difficult. This means any risk assessment 
conducted by companies would be limited to known probabilities and quantifiable 
(Simchi-Levi et al., 2014). Instead, SCDM under ambiguity recognises this lacuna 
and the need to consider optimisation of either strategic or operational decision when 
it is made under the known and ‘unknown’.  
 
2.4. Propositions  
Based on this study’s generic framework, the following propositions can be made 
Proposition 1. Supply chain decision-making is affected by ambiguity 
differently from risk (due to its different nature and sources).   
Proposition 1.1. Ambiguity’s behavioural antecedents affect supply chain 
decisions distinctively to purely normative (rational-based) supply chain 
decision-making.   
Proposition 2. Ambiguity’s effect on supply chain decisions is moderated by 
individual and organisational coping mechanisms.       
Proposition 2.1. Different types of ambiguity have corresponding coping 
mechanisms.  
Proposition 2.2. Individual coping mechanisms can undermine 
organisational coping mechanisms, leading to sub-optimal choices.  
Proposition 2.3. Visibility and collaboration can positively impact supply 
chain decisions (towards optimal choices) as they facilitate information 
sharing.  
Proposition 2.4. Experiential learning is not always virtuously affecting 
supply chain decision-making as imperfect learning arise from selective or 
available experience being used. 
 
3. Two Ambiguous Events – Illustrative Examples  
3.1. Background and Data Sources 
The purpose of these illustrative examples is to conduct a 'factual examination' of two 
events that present features of ambiguity. The two events are, the 2011 Thai flood 
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(Event 1) and 2019/20 Covid-19 pandemic (Event 2). Our choice of events is dictated 
by the fact that natural disasters and pandemics, though disruptive to the supply chain, 
exhibit differences, such as globalised vs. localised effect, demand vs. supply effects, 
and actual infrastructural damages (Manners-Bell, 2014). Hence, such a contrast 
could be revealing about ‘ambiguous disruptions’.  
Archival information was collected about the events, with the main source of 
information obtained through Nexis, the well-known business news database. The 
information was triangulated using archival information from other sources such as 
company releases, press news, and annual reports. The empircal approach we adopt is 
studying facts without hypothesis testing, which has been argued can be useful to 
uncover ‘empircial regularities’ across different events and contexts (Helfat, 2007). 
Furthermore, as one event has passed (Thai Flood) and the other still ongoing at 
the time of writing (Covid-19), though the archival information allows a ‘broad’ 
examination (and comparison), information availability for more ‘specific’ analysis 
compels us to resort to a semi-structured design for Event 1 and an unstructured 
design for Event 2. To be more precise, for Event 1 we study the affected electronics 
and automotive supply chains (see Haraguchi and Lall, 2015), with a ‘focussed’ 
examination of two (affected and non-affected) companies from each industry 
providing a contrasting perspective, while for Event 2 the medical equipment and 
drugs supply chains (see Washington Post, 2020), are studied through (unfocussed 
sampling of) several companies.  
We conduct content analysis of collected second-hand archival sources to 
develop a narrative of facts on properties of our framework. Therefore, the content 
analysis was guided by the following questions:  
 What happened [during the event/ to the supply chain/to the company]?  
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 Why is the event ‘ambiguous’? What are the sources of such ambiguity?  
 What ‘coping mechanisms’ have been used? What specific measures or 
actions did organisations/individuals take?  
By providing organisational and individual levels examination of the two events this 
enables us to empirically illustrate our framework and its properties. Still, we also 
document the events at a broader level, which should allow ‘generalised’ facts to 
emerge.   
 
3.2. Event 1 – 2011 Thai Flood 
In 2011 Thailand experienced heavy continuous rainfall which resulted in severe 
flooding. Though Thailand has been affected by flooding in the past, the 2011 flood 
was highly unexpected and far more severe. The two industries that were most 
affected were electronics and automotive (Haraguchi and Lall, 2015; Manners-Bell, 
2014).  
Table A1 documents in what ways the two supply chains were affected during the 
Event 1, how it was ambiguous (generally) and how the four organisations coped 
therein. Each industry presents contrasting cases of one company that was affected 
(Honda and Western Digital) and one that was not (Nissan and Seagate). Ambiguity 
can be observed at a ‘general’ level, with the prevalence of a lack of clarity (unclear 
signals) and imprecision, with some of these ambiguities being interpretative and 
evaluative in nature (e.g. unclear interpretation and impact).   
Out of the two automotive companies, Nissan’s pro-active strategies such as 
localisation strategies to balance manufacturing and sourcing, and the implementation 
of scenario planning and risk assessment to periodically evaluate the resilience of its 
supply chain (in the guise of proactive challenging continuity drills), seem to have 
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helped the company cope and prepare for future events. Nissan’s Sustainability 
Reports, published yearly, outlines how the company responded to the 2011 Great 
East Japan Earthquake and the 2011 Thai Flood by reviewing its business continuity 
plan and building greater resilience in its supply chain. Similarly, Honda formulated a 
business continuity plan following these two disasters and revised its crisis response 
plan into the “Honda Risk Management Rules”. 
Following Event 1, Western Digital (WD) lost its industry leadership position to 
Seagate, as it lost market share. Seagate fuelled by its acquisition of Samsung HHD 
business and using a vertical manufacturing strategy, forged ahead in contrast. Yet, 
through active leadership and supply chain collaboration, WD was able to bounce 
back relatively quickly (within 46 days of closure and well ahead of schedule), 
showcasing the resilience of its supply chain. In fact, within one year its Thai 
operations were restored to the pre-flood level (Haraguchi and Lall, 2015; Sheffi, 
2020). 
At a broader level, repercussions and lessons learnt from Event 1 about supply 
chains disruptions, was that companies with lean (inventory) operations coped less 
well than companies that had strategic stocks and buffers, such that, redundancy 
afforded time for supply chains to recover. It is also reported that companies that had 
resilience in-built through flexibility in sourcing and operations, also coped better. 
This is because companies having a diversified sourcing strategy were able to shift to 
alternate location facilities (Haraguchi and Lall, 2015). Furthermore, following the 
2011 Great East Japanese Earthquake, some companies used the prior event (for 
which they were also affected) as a valuable learning experience to build resilience 
and preparedness (for future disasters). This is indicative of the virtuous role of 
experiential learning for organisational preparedness (Gunessee et al., 2018).  
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Yet a perusal of these companies’ annual and sustainability reports reveal a focus 
on risk. In particular, on what is quantifiable and known; informed by past experience. 
Nissan’s Sustainability Reports is a case in point. While showcasing a well worked 
“Organization Disaster Recovery”, this is geared towards preparedness for an 
earthquake; informed by a past experience (the 2011 Japanese earthquake to be 
precise). This can be inferred as business continuity planning informed by the 
‘availability heuristic’ (past occurrence).   
 
3.3. Event 2 – Covid-19 Pandemic   
Event 2 has had a major disruptive impact on supply chains in almost every industry 
worldwide, thus epitomising ‘extreme ambiguity’ at work, as both demand and supply 
were affected. In particular, lacklustre demand and restrictions on movement have 
created ambiguity for decision-makers at different points of the global supply chains 
(Bloomberg, 2020; PWC, 2020). 
Table A1 provides an overview of how the medical equipment and drugs supply 
chains have been affected and coping with Event 2. It reveals that companies been 
operating under a lot pressure and ambiguity, in particular, the supply chain of various 
medical products, such as respirators, PPE equipment, ventilators, and drugs 
(Washington Post, 2020). Like for Event 1, Event 2 showcases ambiguity at a 
‘general’ level, with unclear signals, but also interpretative, evaluative and 
probabilistic ambiguities (the latter pertaining to the reliability of health products). 
However, the sources of ambiguity are also highlighted (e.g. lockdown, dependence 
on raw material provider, and complexity).  
With Event 2, there has been an increase in demand for medical equipment, 
leading to a shortage in the face of uncertain demand. This has led to difficulty in 
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forecasting demand and resulting in a ‘bullwhip effect’ consequently. Restrictions on 
movement across the globe starting with the lockdown in China, has meant input 
procurement has been affected as well, which has had a ‘ripple effect’ on the supply 
chain (Sheffi, 2020; Smith, 2020).  
At the same time more specific issues have emerged. First, volatile (reduced) 
demand due to panic buying and social distancing (Sheffi, 2020). Second, continuity 
of supply and constraints in procuring key components. Third, labour availability and 
re-routing due to lockdowns globally (PWC, 2020). Fourth, reliability of medical 
equipment and coordination within the supply chain, especially with unorthodox 
suppliers (companies from other industries) answering calls to help out. A case in 
point is Dyson, the British manufacturer of vacuum cleaners, which according to a 
BBC news report, found itself with ‘no longer required’ ventilators it engaged in 
producing without clear demand.  
At the organisational level, coping strategies have taken the form of stockpiling, 
blended local and global supply chain, greater supply chain visibility and various 
forms of collaboration (see Table A1). Given ambiguity arises due to various forms of 
information imperfections (missing or unclear or subject to conflicting interpretation), 
a strategy of information sharing should aid an organisation.   
At the individual decision-making level, Event 2 shows the inadequacies of 
individual decisions under ambiguity in two ways: risk assessment; cognitive biases. 
First, ‘informed’ risk identification and assessment while useful in normal situations 
are less reliable for highly disruptive situations due to limited data. Event 2 
exemplifies this. A risk assessment conducted by The Global Fund in March 12 
reported mostly ‘low to moderate’ operational risk for various assessed areas of the 
global health product supply chains, while fast forward to its report on May 25 this 
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risk assessment was now noted as moderate, such that it now expects delays for every 
order (see The Global Fund, 2020). Similarly, the Institute for Supply Management’s 
Survey about Covid-19’s global supply chain disruptions documented the fact that in 
‘early March more than 80 percent believed their organization would experience some 
impact due to COVID-19 disruptions. By the end of March, this increased to 95 
percent of organizations who will be or have already been impacted by coronavirus’ 
(ISM, 2020). 
It has been noted that Event 2 as an ambiguous event exhibited several cognitive 
biases that usually plague decision-making (Alexander, 2020; Chaxel, 2020; 
Davenport, 2020; Smith, 2020). We summarise two here.    
 
Status quo bias and overconfidence. In the early stages of Event 2, many 
organisations failed to act, mainly due to their unwillingness to change, with anything 
shifting them from their status quo point seen as a loss (Davenport, 2020). The 
illusion of control and that companies were somewhat prepared for this eventuality, 
can further explain such inaction, suggesting an element of overconfidence. Echoing 
the above reported surveys by the ISM and the risk assessment of The Global Fund, 
but as a broader attitude, companies initially felt Event 2 “would not be major 
disruption – and that even if it were, we would be ready to confront it” (Chaxel, 
2020).  
 
Availability heuristic and imperfect learning. Event 2 being complex and 
multifaceted, meant to better understand it people focussed on what was readily 
‘available’ and accessible, through massive media coverage (Davenport, 2020). For 
supply chain decision-makers they used learning from experience to mitigate 
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prevailing ambiguity. Thus, regularly gathering information and interpreting it, has 
allowed decision-makers to chart and improve their course of action (Chaxel, 2020).  
While feedback learning should help with ‘mitigation’ (at the time of 
occurrence), experiential learning for ‘preparedness’ by learning from historical data 
highlights the truism of Proposition 2.4; that experiential learning is imperfect if it is 
based on availability heuristic. Indeed, while the occurrence of pandemics has been 
deemed as small but non-negligible (Manners-Bell, 2014), its probability of 
occurrence and all contingency planning has been based on a ‘flu-pandemic’ and not a 
‘coronavirus-pandemic’. Reasoning behind this is the flu-pandemic has been 
estimated more likely than a coronavirus-pandemic, based on past occurrence and 
thus what consequently is more likely. Not surprisingly, as a ‘preventive’ measure, 
this led to the stockpiling of ‘flu’ vaccines (Alexander, 2020).    
 
3.4. Summative facts   
Based on the stylised facts we observe across the two events and various affected 
supply chains therein, we conclude  
Fact 1: Disruptions can be interpreted as ambiguous if the types and 
antecedents of ambiguity are observed (as being salient in the situational 
context).  
Fact 2: Decision-makers during disruptions exhibit cognitive biases due to 
ambiguous (limited) data, with risk assessment highly inadequate.    
Fact 3: Visibility and collaboration help with information sharing and reduce 
information incompleteness and ambiguity about a disruption, but 
organisational learning is limited in its positive influence, as enterprises’ 
preparedness is geared towards the known or quantifiable.      
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4. Conclusions  
The main implications of this work are theoretical in nature. First, at a broader level is 
our contribution to behavioural OM (Donohue et al., 2019, 2020), which explicates a 
‘descriptive’ SCDM framework under ambiguity. This study has shown that 
incorporating ambiguity, with behavioural foundations, in the supply chain context 
makes a difference. SCDM is quite distinct when conceptualised with than without 
ambiguity, whether seen through the behavioural antecedents or individual coping 
mechanisms. The propositions derived from our generic framework highlight this 
distinctiveness.  
Second, our paper develops a typology of ambiguity, categorised as, interpretative, 
causal, evaluative and probabilistic. These ambiguity types have a correspondence 
with specific individual ‘coping’ mechanisms, namely, sense-making, tolerance, 
status quo referencing and heuristics. It also shows how individual coping 
mechanisms can undermine organisational ‘coping’ strategies, leading to sub-optimal 
choices. For example, an intolerance or aversion to probabilistic ambiguity can lead to 
an unwillingness to recognise and even underestimating it, and an illusion of control 
and being prepared, lead to the catastrophic decision to ‘do nothing’.  
Third, our framework reveals the positive role of visibility and collaboration in the 
supply chain context to cope with information incompleteness as a source of 
ambiguity. However, perhaps the most striking insight is that of imperfect 
organisational ‘experiential’ learning. This arises due to the decision-maker’s 
predilection for availability heuristic, which implies the use of common ‘similar’ 
experiences and at times what is known, through updated priors.  
The properties of our framework was assessed through two ambiguous events, 
2011 Thai Flood and 2019/20 Covid-19, empirically illustrating its value to further 
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our understanding of SCDM under ambiguity. Three main facts were documented: 
that disruptions do highlight features of ambiguity in the global supply chain; that 
decision managers during disruptions do exhibit cognitive biases; and that, 
organisational strategies of visibility and collaboration allow organisations to better 
cope with ambiguity but organisational learning is limited due to availability heuristic.  
In terms of practical implications of this work, there is a need for companies to 
plan not for risk but ambiguity. Far too often enterprises think in terms of supply 
chain risk management (SCRM). This study emphasised the problematic issue with 
this framework as being too reliant on the probabilistic approach; risk and the known.  
Alternative approaches could be explored. These include balancing alternative 
approaches with the probabilistic approach that uses ‘interval’ probabilities and 
‘robust’ approaches that encompass threats, opportunities and the unforeseen (Aven, 
2014, p.163). Then, scenario planning and simulated exercises could be broached. For 
instance, planning for different scenarios where ignorance or unknown unknowns 
subsist may help gain intelligence in preparing for unforeseen contingencies. Such 
planning could develop scenarios of states of the world with different likelihood and 
information sets, connected to distinct types of ambiguity (e.g. interpretative or 
probabilistic) and normal and disruptive situational contexts (Friberg, 2015, pp. 160-
161; Schoemaker, 2004).  
However, all of these need to factor in the fact that decision-makers are prone to 
errors and biases whether when they evaluate situational outcomes or making 
judgements about occurrence of events. Coping strategies at the organisational level 
far often eschew the human factor; a supply chain however robust or resilient, can be 
undermined by decision-makers’ penchant to use heuristics and subsequently by 
cognitive biases (Davenport, 2020; Roberto et al., 2006).  
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In this optic to make ‘better’ decisions when supply chains are ambiguous (and 
under strain), organisations could rely on greater visibility and cooperative strategies 
geared towards gathering data to feed into more effective scenario planning under 
ambiguity, at the organisational level. However, at the individual level there is a need 
to better interpret such information (sense-making), whether through critical thinking, 
expert judgement and group decision-making. During major disruptions, smarter 
decisions can be made by using the so-called ‘fishbowl’ approach, where apart from 
usual decision-makers and experts, other people are involved as observers and are 
invited in when they have ideas to share (Alexander et al., 2020).  
Furthermore, at an even very basic level there is a need to educate executives and 
supply chain practitioners about our probabilistic world, biases and representations 
(see Larrick, 2004). A training program of ‘scenario planning under ambiguity’ that 
coaches about types of ambiguities and coping mechanisms, in particular the use of 
judgements, heuristics and logical analysis under different scenarios of an ambiguous 
world is needed.     
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Table A1. Ambiguity-coping during the 2011 Thai Flood and Covid-19 supply chain disruptions 
2011 Thai Flood 
Supply 
Chains 
Specific disruption Ambiguity  Coping mechanisms  
(Resilience, Preparedness, Mitigation) 
Automotive Honda:  
Factories inundated, having to 
stop production, with 
inability to access facility, 200 
suppliers suspended 
operations. 
 
Nissan: 
Factories were not inundated 
but production stopped due 
to missing parts. 
 
Honda:  
 Unable to make recovery decision due to ambiguous 
information. 
 Unclear about alternate solution for a safer location 
 Timing of parts supply unclear. 
 Knock on effect of geo-dispersed activities, with 
supply constraints in Thailand creating uncertain 
demand bottlenecks for global operations. 
 
Nissan: 
 Unclear whether to focus on company’s recovery or 
focus on brand. 
 Unclear with impact of volatile business 
environment and global competition. 
 
 
Honda: 
 Recovered after 174 days 
 Created new facility in Indonesia 
 Advancement in corrective forecasting helped company to match 
supply and demand. 
 Alternate sourcing from different countries.  
 Collective work with suppliers 
 
Nissan: 
 Recovered after 29 days   
 Localisation strategies balancing manufacturing and sourcing 
foot print and diversified sources of supply with alternate 
facilities in the same country 
 New scenarios implemented based on challenging drills to check 
the efficacy of measures implemented by global disaster 
headquarters.   
 Risk assessment before sourcing decisions from the leading 
global competitive countries and providing support for 
improvement activities after sourcing helped to survive during 
disaster.  
Electronics Western Digital: 
Factories inundated, having to 
stop production for 46 days 
from mid-October till late 
November 
 
Seagate: 
Factories were not inundated 
but was affected due to lack of 
supplies, affecting the hard 
disk drive supply chain  
Western Digital: 
 Unclear impact with loss of market share due to 
manufacturing capacity, and relationship between 
pre-flood demand and regaining of market share. 
 
Seagate: 
 Interpretation of localised sourcing and its impact on 
cost reduction and logistics service improvement. 
 
Western Digital: 
 Met increase in demand by surplus inventory within the shortest 
time span. 
 Active leadership & investment on people helped to recover fast. 
 Spontaneous agreements with suppliers to supply incremental 
needs of components for hard disk drive.  
 
Seagate: 
 Unaffected component and disk assembly facilities contributed to 
performance. 
 Vertical manufacturing strategy adopted by the company to 
produce critical components on its own, which avoided the 
reliance on limited suppliers who were affected by the flood.  
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Covid-19 
Supply 
Chains 
Specific Medical Products Ambiguity  Coping mechanisms  
(Resilience, Preparedness, Mitigation) 
Medical 
Equipment 
Respirators/Masks  Uncertainty due to rising demand of face mask & 
constrained supply. 
 Interpretation of how supply affected, securing of 
imported raw materials and order fulfilment to 
health care providers 
 Unclear about estimated inventory levels 
 Reliability of masks 
 Joint agreement with administration to ensure continuous 
supply 
 Interactions with administrative leadership  
 Added staff, technology, added manufacturing lines.  
 Speed – premium for manufacturers to retool production lines 
 Forming an alternative network for producing masks with new 
car manufacturers. Use of diapers, napkins producers to produce 
alternate materials. 
 PPE equipment  Authenticity/Reliability of PPE equipment 
 Proportion of demand that could be satisfied 
 Recall of surgical gowns because of exposure to 
bacteria. 
 China’s lock down reduces capacity throughout 
industry 
 Creativity and agility in producing needed products such as PPE 
during crisis, local sourcing with cooperation of small 
manufacturers. 
 Network of small buyers created for better coordination 
 Use personal network and social media to generate money and 
connect people. 
 Ramping up capacity  
 Open source design to create incubation boxes for health care 
workers  
 ‘Bits and Pieces’ program to coordinate the effort of non-medical 
companies.  
 Ventilators  Production for ambiguous demand (answering call 
for help without specific customer) 
 Unorthodox material suppliers unsure how to 
contribute 
 Estimating the production run 
 Seeking alternate source outside medical supply chain to avoid 
conflict 
 Using existing network connected to new sources such as 
government and distribution channel like Amazon.com 
 
Drugs Generic Drugs  Drug supply chain is opaque and complex, leading 
to full scope of vulnerabilities being unknown 
 Dependence on one country (China) for raw 
ingredients’ in drug manufacturing 
 Hard to understand complex supply chain, as 
proprietary information held only by few players. 
 Greater visibility into the supply chain to better assess risks and 
potential disruptions. 
 Stock piling, sourcing from more than one supplier 
 Planning to develop blended supply chain with local and global 
sourcing. 
 
